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Viewing strategies in combinatorial games non-deterministically, i.e. simply like strenghtened 
rules, yields imple proofs of stability theorems. The existence of a winning strategy can be proved 
without he axiom of choice. Among the persistent (--- loss preventing) strategies there is a largest 
one, but even if the game is won for some of the players, there is not always a largest winning 
strategy. However, there is a largest strategy such that one wins with certainty by playing it at 
random. The theorem on the value of a game with a preference function is proved in a minimax 
form. 
A strategy (in the narrow sense, see [6], [5]) in a combinator ia l  game is usually 
understood as a regulation telling the player on move in a given state of  the game 
how to move. Thus, it is a mapping S: X- - ,X  where X is the set of  states. Equal ly 
well one can view it (non-determinist ical ly) as a relat ion S C X x X:  thus, a strategy 
consists in a special enhancing the strictness of  the rules for the player in question. 
In these notes we advocate this latter point of  view. It enables us, e.g., to give 
a very short p roo f  of  the existence of  a persistent strategy, to give a proof  of  the 
existence of  a winning strategy without the ax iom of  choice (Section 2), or to for- 
mulate and prove the theorem on the value of  a game with a preference function 
(cf. [1]) in a minimax form (Section 4). Technical ly, the crucial role is being played 
by the fact that, unlike in the former point  of  view, one has something like the best 
non-losing strategy, namely the largest one. In connect ion with this, the question 
natural ly  arises as to whether there is also the largest winning strategy - to be im- 
mediately refuted. Of  course there is often none such. But, on the other hand, there 
is something close to it, namely the largest strategy such that you win when playing 
it at random (or, systematical ly, in a sense). Moreover,  this largest almost-winning 
strategy is very natural ly related to the best approx imat ion  of  a non-losing strategy 
o f  the adversary (Section 3). 
1. Preliminaries 
1.1. A game is a quintuple F=(X,  Y,A,B, xo) where X (resp. Y) is the set of  states 
in which the first (resp. second) player is supposed to make a move, A C X x Y (resp. 
BC YxX)  are the rules according to which the first (resp. second) player moves; 
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Xo is the initial state. 
A lost position for the first (resp. second) player is an x e X (resp. y e Y) such that 
xA = 0 (resp. yB = 0). 
1.2. I f  RCXx Y, SC YxX are relations, an RS-play is a (finite or infinite) 
sequence 
X1, Yl, X2, Y2, "'" 
with xiRyi and YiSXi+l  . I f  we wish to specify the first state or states, we use the 
expressions 
xlRS-play, or xlylRS-play. 
On the other hand, speaking simply about a play in connection with a given game 
(X, Y,A,B, xo), we have in mind an xoAB-play. 
A play is said to be complete if it either is infinite or terminates in a position lost 
for the player to move. In the latter case, the player in question is said to lose and 
the other one to win; the infinite plays are considered as draws. 
1.3. A strategy for the first, resp. second, player in the game F is a subrelation 
SCA, resp. SCB. (Cf. the strategies in the narrow sense, e.g. in [6].) 
1.4. Two technical definitions. Consider relations R CXx  Y and SC Yx X. 
(1) We say that R answers S if 
xRySz = zR--/:O. 
(2) We put 
R _L S = {(x, Y) lxRy&yS = 13}. 
1.5. A strategy of the first resp. second player in (X, Y,A,B, xo) is said to be stable 
if it answers B resp. A. A stable strategy of the first (resp. second) player is said 
to be persistent if
xoS~O (resp. xo(A iS)  =0) 
(note that the second is the same as the implication xoAY = yS--gO); it is said to 
be terminating if there is no infinite xoSB-play (resp. xoAS-play). A winning 
strategy is a terminating persistent one. 
Remarks. Thus, a player following a winning strategy necessarily wins, one follow- 
ing a persistent strategy draws at least. 
I f  the rules A, B themselves do not allow an infinite play (which is often the case), 
a persistent strategy is automatically a winning one. 
1.6. Notation. Obviously, if R i answers  S for any i e I ,  UielRi answers S as well. 
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Thus, there is always the largest stable strategy of the first resp. second player. Let 
us denote it by 
S(A, B), resp. S(B, A). 
I f  the rules in question follow from the context, we write simply 
$1 for S(A,B), SIx for S(B,A). 
Further, we put 
Tt = A ± S H, Tu = B ± S 1. 
1.7. Lemma. (1) (y , z )eB\  S n = ZTl~:O (and similarly for A \ SI and Tn), 
(2) TI answers B (and similarly TII answers A), 
(3) A .i. TH C St. 
Proof .  (1) Since SII is largest, S'=SuU{(y,z)} does not answer A and hence we 
have yS'zA w with wSn = O, so that (z, w) e A ± Sn = TI. 
(2) If xTlyBz, we cannot have (y,z)eSu. Thus zTi~eO by (1). 
(3) If (x,y)eA_LTn, we have xAy&(yBz ~ ZSl~e0 ). Thus, {(x,y)}US l is 
stable. Recall that Si is largest such. [] 
1.8. Theorem. At least one of the player has a persistent s rategy. Moreover, if the 
first (resp. second) one has none, T u (resp. T I) is persistent. 
Proof .  If S l is not persistent, we have xoSl=0 and hence (see 1.7(3)) 
xo(A ± T u) = 0. If  Sll is not persistent, we have Xo T1 = xo(A ± SIt) :g 0. [] 
1.9. Proposit ion.  (1) A 1 C A 2 & Bl D B 2 = S(A 1, Bl) C S(A 2, B2). 
(2) For RCS(B,A) one has S(B,A 1R)=S(B,A). Consequently, 
SII : S(B, S i )  = S(B, t l ) .  
Proof .  (1) is obvious and implies S(B,A)CS(B,A±R).  Put S=S(B,A±R).  I f  
xSyAz we have either zR = 0 and then (y, z) ¢ A 3_ R which is answered by S so that 
zS~O; or, zR~O and then ZSDzS(B,A)DzR--/:O. Thus, S answers A and hence 
ScS(RA) .  Finally, T~CS 1 by 1.7(2). [] 
2. Winning strategies, without the ax iom of choice 
2.1. We will use the notation as to fit into proving that if the second player has no 
persistent strategy, the first has a winning one. The proof of the statement with the 
roles reversed can be obtained by an obvious modification. The symbols TI, S u are 
as in 1.6. 
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For R CA put 
OR =R \ {(x, y)[~/infinite xyRB-play&~(x,z)  6R  
such that all xzRB-plays are finite}. 
Define R a for ordinals a as follows: 
Ro = R, R~ + 1 = ORes, 
R~= ~ R# for limit a. 
D'<ct 
Finally put 
Roo = ~ R a • 
2.2. Lemma. Let x e X be fixed and let fl be the smallest ordinal such that 
xR~ ~ xR. Then fl = y + 1 and we have 
xRo~ = xR~ = { u ] all xuRyB-plays are finite}. 
Proof. If (x ,y)eRy for all y<f l  where fl is a limit ordinal, we have (x ,y)eRB= 
~y<~ Ry. Thus, fl = y + 1 and xRy+ 1 =x(ORy) :~xRy =xR. Thus, both U= {(x, u) lY 
infinite xuRyB-play} and V= {(x, u) ] all xuRyB-plays are finite} are non-void and 
we have xRy+l=xV. Hence there is no infinite xuR,~B-play with a>y.  Thus, 
xR~=xR~ for a>_fl. [] 
2.3. Corollaries. (1) There & an a such that Roo=R~. Consequently, 
OR~ = RoD. 
(2) xR--#O = xRoo4:0. 
(3) I f  R is persistent, Roo is. 
(4) I f  there is an infinite xRoo B-play, then xRoo = xR. 
Proof.  For xeX let a(x) be the least ordinal such that xR~(x)¢xR if there is such; 
otherwise put a(x) =0. Choose an a such that a>_a(x) for all xeX.  Then R~ =R, .  
The statements (2), (3) and (4) immediately follow. [] 
2.4. Theorem. I f  one of  the players has no pers&tent strategy, the other has a winn- 
ing strategy. 
Proof. Let the second player have no persistent strategy. We will prove that 
W= (TI)~ is a winning strategy for the first player. 
By 1.8 and 2.3(3), W is persistent. Put 
C= {(y,x) eBI2/ inf inite yxBW-play}. 
We will show, first, that 
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(*) C answers Tl. 
Indeed, let yCxTiz. Since there is an infinite yxBW-play we have xWz by 2.3(4). 
Now suppose zC=O. Then every W-play is finite and hence every xzWB-play is 
finite. Since, however, by 2.3(1), OW= W, we obtain that every xWB-play is finite 
in contradiction with yCx. 
Now, by (*) and 1.9(2), CCS~I. Suppose C~0.  Choose (y,x)~C and (x,z)~ T I 
(such a z exists by the definition of C). By (.), O~zCCzSII in contradiction with 
T I=A±S H. [] 
2.5. Remark. The transfinite construction used has to be, in general, really trans- 
finite. In fact, it is easy to construct games Fa such that the corresponding R~ 
strictly decrease for f l< a. 
3. How to win using T l (or: The largest weakly winning strategy) 
3.1. Recall 1.6: Unions of persistent strategies are persistent so that if a player has 
a persistent strategy, he has the largest persistent strategy as well. 
In contrast, there is nothing like a largest winning strategy. Consider the example 
depicted in Fig. 1 (the moves of the first player are indicated by full arrows, those 
of the second player by the dotted ones): The moves labelled by 1 (resp. 2) con- 
stitute a winning strategy W~ (resp. W2). The stategy W~ L)W2, however, admits 
the infinite play xoabcdabcd.... 
0 a 
] / /  22~ \\\x\ 
/ ",. b 
0_ d0 \  ~- a~ " ,0 .0 
x0 ,, / 





3.2. As in the previous ection, we will discuss the situation from the point of view 
of the first player winning. The corresponding statements for the roles reversed will 
be obvious. 
Let a game F=(X, Y,A,B, xo) be given, let SCA be a strategy. An S-procedure 
is a system of rules telling the first player how to move, such that the concrete moves 
obey (a.o.) always the strategy S. Thus, any S'CS can be viewed as an S-procedure, 
apd a strategy in the wide sense (taking into account he previous moves - see [6]) 
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obeying S is one. Also, regulations including random choice can be considered as 
procedures. 
3.3. An S-procedure P is said to have property (N) if in each infinite SB-play 
x0, Y0,Xl, Yl .... obeying P, whenever x has infinitely many occurrences as xi, every 
(x, y) e S has infinitely many occurrences as (x i, Yi). 
3.4. Let F be finite (i.e., XU Y finite). Then playing at random in S is a procedure 
satisfying (N). This procedure will be denoted by 
rand S. 
3.5. Let Fbe  finite. The following is an example of a deterministic procedure satis- 
fying (N): 
For x ~ X such that xS-~ 0 order the (x, y)~ S into a sequence 
(x, s(x, 0)) . . . . .  (x, s(x, n x - 1)). 
Play as follows: In the first move or responding to a (u,x) which the adversary has 
used for the first time, play (x, s(x, 0)); when responding to a (u, z) used before, play 
(x,s(z, i+ 1)) where (x,s(x, i)) has been the last previous response to (u,z) (the addi- 
tion mod nx). 
3.6. Proposition. Let F be finite, SCA.  Then the fol lowing two statements are 
equivalent: 
(1) Every S-procedure P with the property (N) wins. 
(2) rand S wins. 
Proof. Obviously (1) = (2). Now, let (2) hold and let there be an infinite play 
XoYoX, Y, ..., XnYn"" 
obeying P which satisfies (N). Let us construct a new play 
! / ! ¢ t ! 
XoYoXIYl "'" XnYn 
as follows: Put x~ =x0; if x0 occurs infinitely many times among the xi, choose an 
element y with xoSY at random; then choose an i 0 such that (Xo, y)= (x~,, Yio) and 
t ! t / ! / t p 
put Yo =Yio, Xl •Xio+ 1" Otherwise put Yo =Yo, x; =xl.  Now let XoYo...x n_ lYn- lXn be 
t 
already chosen, Yj=Yij, xj=x6_,+l. I f  xn occurs infinitely many times as an xi, 
choose a y with x',,Sy at random; then choose an in> i n_ 1 so that (x~, y )= (xin, Yin) 
t t I 1 
and put Yn =Yin, Xn+ 1 ~-Xi~+ 1- Otherwise put Yn =Yi.  l+ 1, Xn+ 1 =Xi~ 1+2" The result- 
ing play obviously obeys rand S and is infinite in contradiction with (2). [] 
3.7. Let us say that a strategy S is weakly winning if rand S wins (so that, by 3.6, 
any procedure with (N) wins). 
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3.8. Theorem. Let F be finite and let the second player have no pers&tent strategy. 
Then Tl is the largest weakly winning strategy of the first player. 
Proof .  Obviously, it suffices to prove that it is weakly winning, moving in A \ T~ 
enables the adversary to draw at least. 
Thus, consider a Trprocedure P with the property (N). Let there be an infinite 
T~B-play 
XoY oX l Y l " " " XnYn  " " 
obeying P. Thus, the relation 
U= {(y,x)[(y,x) =(yi,xi+ 1) for infinitely many i} 
is non-void. We will show that U answers 7"[. Indeed let us have yUxTzz. We have 
x=x i for infinitely many i and hence (x, z )= (xiYi) for i e J with an infinite J. Since 
zB is finite, there is a u such that (Z ,U)=(y i ,X i+ l )  for infinitely many i, hence, 
UcS(B,  Tt )=S n (see 1.9). But this is a contradiction: Take a (yi, xi+l)EU; we 
have (x i ,  Y i )EAA_S I I  and hence yiU=O. [] 
3.9. Remark.  The assumption on finiteness in 3.8 is essential. Consider the follow- 
ing example: 
Let D be the set of all finite sequences of O's and l 's;  consider a one-one mapping 
~0: D-- ,N \ {0, 1,2, . . . ,n} where N is the set of  natural numbers and a mapping 
q/: D~D such that for w=(i 1 .. . . .  ik) we have 
Put 
qJ(w) = (il . . . . .  ik, ik + 1 .. . . .  i~o(w)). 
X= Y={weD I w¢qJ(o)*u, u non-void}, 
A = { ((i I . . . .  , ix), (il . . . .  , ik, ik + 1)) t (il, "",  ik + 1 ) e X }, 
B= {(w, w) lweX \ qJ(D)} ; 
Xo is the void word. 
Furthermore,  for k fixed put Ark = {(il . . . . .  ik)l(il . . . . .  ik) ~X}.  Obviously, X k is the 
set of  states the first player can reach after k moves. We see that iXkl =2k  for k<_n 
and ]Xk l>_2k- -2k -n+l>2 k-1 for k>n.  We see easily that Sn=O and hence 
TI = A. I f  we play at random, all the w in Xk are equally probable so that the prob- 
ability of terminating after k moves is 0 for k<n and <2 -k+l  for k>_n. Thus, the 
probabi l i ty of  terminating at all when playing at random is less than 2 -"+2 . Note 
that, moreover,  the game in the example has only two choices in each move of the 
first player (and just one for the second player). 
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4. Games with preference functions 
4.1. A game with a preference function (see [1]) consists of a game F= 
(X, Y,A,B, xo) and a function f :  XU Y-+R* (where R* is the set of reals plus + oo). 
The objective for the first player is to reach as high a value as possible, the second 
player tries to keep it as low as possible. More exactly, put, for a play p, 
v(p) = sup { f (zi ) I P = ZoZ l Z2 " " ; z0 = x0}; 
the first player plays so as to make v(p) large, the second one tries to prevent it. 
The variants where the f is defined on X or on Y only, are easily transformed to 
our case by defining the values of f to be - oo in the remaining points. 
4.2. The set of all complete RS-plays (recall 1.2) will be denoted by C(R,S). 
4.3. Theorem. We have 
sup inf o(p)=inf  sup v(p). 
TcA pcC(T,B) ScB pEC(A,S) 
Moreover, either the supremum on the left hand side or the infimum on the right 
hand side is achieved. 
Proof. Define F~ = (XU {o9}, YU {co}, A~, B a, x0) where 
Aa= A U {(x, ag) l f (x)>et }, 
B a = (B \ {(y, x) l f (y)  >- a}) U {(y, og)[yB = 0 &f (y )  < or}. 
Obviously, a<f l  = B~CB~&AI~CA ~so that (recall 1.9) 
a<f l  = S(B~,A~)CS(BB,A~). 
Put 
o o =sup{otlS(Ba,A~) is not persistent}. 
Let a< v0 (or a= o0 in case S(Boo, Aoo) is still not persistent). Then there is in Fo a 
winning strategy T' for the first player. Put T= T 'N(X× Y). Let 
p = XoYo"'xnYn"" 
be a complete TB-play. If it is infinite, there is an n such that (Yn,Xn+ 1) ~ B \ Ba (T' 
is terminating in F~) so that f(yn)>_a. If it is finite and ends in x~, we have 
f(x,)>_a (since p, while complete in F, has to proceed in A~ \ A). I f  it ends in y,  
we have to have f (y~)>ot since otherwise the second player would win in F by 
moving to ~o. Thus, in any case, v (p )>a and hence 
inf v(p)>et (1) 
peC(T,B) 
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Let a > v0 (or c~ = v0 in case S(Boo, A~ o) is already persistent). Then S '= S(B~, A~) is 
persistent. Put S = S' f) (Y × X)  and consider a complete AS-play p = XoYo'"xnYn'". 
Since S' is persistent in Fa, we have f (xn)<a for all n (to prevent the move 
(x~, ~o)). I f  y~ is the last state in p we have to have f (yn)< a to be able to move in 
F a; if the play proceeds to x, + 1 we have f(y,,) < a again to keep in B a (which con- 
tains S'). Thus we have 
sup v(p)<_a. (2) 
p~C(A,C) 
From (1) and (2) we immediately conclude that 
a=in f  sup v(p) <_ Vo <_ sup inf v(p)=b. 
SCB C(A,S) TCA C(T,B) 
Now if we had a<b there would have to exist SCB and TCA such that 
sup v (p)< inf v(p). 
C(A, S) C(7", B) 
This is impossible since, for any TS-play Po, V(Po) minorizes the left hand side and 
majorizes the right hand side. [] 
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